For 2005, Microsoft fixed 37 critical issues with an average of 46 days from the flaw being known to the public to them having a patch available.
For 2005, Red Hat (across all products) fixed 21 critical issues with an average of 1 day from the flaw being known to the public to having a patch available. (To get the list and a XML spreadsheet, grab the data set mentioned in my previous blog and run "perl daysofrisk.pl --distrib all --datestart 20050101 --dateend 20051231 --severity C").
(The blog also looks at the time between notification to the company and a patch, whilst daysofrisk.pl currently doesn't report that, the raw data is there and I just need to coax it out to see how we compare to the 133 days for Microsoft)
But don't take my word for it, a people.redhat.com/mjc download the raw data files and the perl script and run it yourself, in this case
perl daysofrisk.pl --datestart 20050101 --dateend 20051231 --severity C --distrib rhel3
Different distributions, dates, and so on will give you different results, so you might like to customize it to see how well we did fixing the vulnerabilities that you cared about. (Zero days of risk doesn't always mean we knew about issues in advance either, the reported= date in the cve_dates.txt file can help you see when we got advance notice of an issue).
Red Hat released updates to PHP to correct this vulnerability for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 and 4 in July 2005. Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1 was not affected by this vulnerability. Fedora Core 4 and Fedora Core 3 also got updates in July.
Our analysis showed that the default SELinux targeted policy on Enterprise Linux 4 would have blocked the specific instances of this worm seen so far, but is not sufficient to block a worm written differently from exploiting this vulnerability if left unpatched. Time to make sure all your servers are up2date!
The kernel accounted for 14% of all the vulnerabilities fixed, followed closely by mozilla (11%), ethereal (9%), squid (4%), gaim (4%), httpd (3%), php (3%), krb5 (2%).
In fact, half of all the vulnerabilities fixed are in only those 8 packages, and just 20 packages comprise of two-thirds of all vulnerabilities.
But we fix a large number of security issues rated as 'low' severity which can influence the data. So if we weight vulnerabilities by severity (I used a metric of "Critical *100 + Important*20 + Moderate*5 + Low") then you get this list:
Enterprise Linux 3 top 10 packages with the most 'more severe' issues:
Repeating this same process for Enterprise Linux 4, Firefox replaces Mozilla in the #1 position, thunderbird, HelixPlayer, and evolution (all new packages for Enterprise Linux 4) make the top 10 displacing libpng, cups, php, cvs.
Out of all those Red Hat Enterprise Linux vulnerablities, only 2 were critical based on the Microsoft severity scale. That means only 2 vulnerabilities could have potentially allowed a worm to spread without interaction. Out of the Microsoft vulnerabilities there are 8 critical.
So whilst it might be harder to hold 200 sweets in your hand without dropping a few, I'd rather be holding 200 sweets and 2 ticking timebombs than 30 sweets and 8 ticking timebombs.
The perl script used to analyse the raw stats has also had some updates and no longer needs to be edited to filter the vulnerabilities you are interested in. Run "perl daysofrisk.pl --help" for details.
For Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 across all dates (20 months) we've had 13 critical vulnerabilities; of which 84% had updates available via Red Hat Network within a day of the vulnerability being public.
Despite the report's claim to incorporate a qualitative assessment of vendor reactions to serious vulnerabilities, the headline metrics treats all vulnerabilities as equal, regardless of their risk to users.
Their headline figure is 61 days of risk for a Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 minimal installation with the addition of MySQL server from Red Hat Enterprise Linux Extras.
That sounds like a lot of days of risk - but if you filter their dataset by severity, using the Microsoft scale for determining the severity of each issue you find the following:
** Critical issues: 3 total issues. All fixed on the same day as first public disclosure, therefore having 0 days average risk.
** Critical plus Important: 49 total, with 34 average days of risk
Red Hat prioritise all vulnerabilities and fix first those that matter the most. We publish our raw data and metrics at https://people.redhat.com/mjc/
Days of risk statistics only tell a small part of the story: studies show consumers take some time to apply patches even after a vendor has produced a security update. At Red Hat we continue to work on ways to help people keep their machines up to date. Last year we added Exec-Shield to Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 which included support for processor EDB (execute disable bit) and NX (no execute) technology. Earlier this year Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 shipped with Security Enhanced Linux turned on by default. These technology innovations are designed to reduce the risk of security issues.
Just finished the security audit for FC4 candidate - For 20030101-20050605 there are a potential 861 CVE named vulnerabilities that could have affected FC4 packages. 759 (88%) of those are fixed because FC4 includes an upstream version that includes a fix, 8 (1%) are still outstanding, and 94 (11%) are fixed with a backported patch. I'll post all the details to fedora-devel-list later in the week. I'm also giving a keynote about Fedora and security response at FudCon later this month.
A CSO remarked to me a couple of weeks ago that their perception was that OpenSSL had a lot of serious security issues over the years. In fact it's really only had a couple of serious issues, and in total only 15 issues in the last 4 years. So in the style of the Apache vulnerability database I did one for OpenSSL. This is now publically available and we'll keep it up to date. The page is built from a XML database of the issues.